We ask in a multiple agent moral hazard model whether a principal wants an agent to observe the output of a colleague before (ex ante information) or after the agent chooses his effort (ex post information). Ex ante information allows to exploit flexibility gains. This makes it (weakly) better than ex post information if the colleague's output is uninformative about the agent's effort, i.e. if it provides no additional information on whether the agent worked hard or shirked. If this output is informative, a trade-off arises when choosing the optimal information structure: under ex ante information there are flexibility gains, but a negative incentive effect occurs. Thus, ex ante can do strictly worse than ex post information. We discuss the implications of these findings for the organizational structure of a firm and the way it manages information: U-form firms should be less transparent than M-form firms.
Introduction
In principal agent theory additional information about the effort of the agent is (weakly) beneficial (Holmstrom 1979 ). An important piece of such information is the performance of colleagues working on closely related projects (Mookherjee 1984) . But while it is well known that this (ex post) information helps to provide incentives, relatively little is known about the optimal timing of information: should the agent observe the performance of a colleague before he provides effort or after that?
The optimal timing is, however, an important question for firms: according to a study by KPMG (2000) 81% of leading firms in Europe and the US have the intention to implement an information or knowledge management system to provide employees access to information at the right time.
1 One common way to do so is the introduction of data banks which employees may access before they make their decisions. Such data banks can e.g. contain statistics about performances of departments and colleagues, or descriptions and outcomes of projects. Next to this hard information, also soft factors
influence when and what an employee knows about his coworkers: Tsai (2002) points out that social interactions are positively associated with intra organizational knowledge sharing. To foster these some firms started to create common spaces (e.g British Airways, NatWest Markets or the labs of Ericcson and GlaxoWellcome). For example, they build a coffee bar, place many employees in an open-plan office instead of confining them to single offices, or colocate a worker's office in a different department.
One of the main advantages such information management systems should bring along is to make better decisions (Earl 2001) . But also an employee's incentives might be affected.
The aim of this paper is to take also these incentives into account when asking under which circumstances a principal wants to implement an information management system that helps an employee to receive information about the performance of a colleague before rather than after he takes an action.
For this we employ a simple moral hazard model with a risk neutral principal and two risk neutral and wealth constrained agents. Each agent produces an individually observable and verifiable output, which can be either high or low. An agent's success probability depends on his effort, which also can be either high or low. As this effort is unobservable to the principal, she designs a reward scheme for each agent that conditions on the agent's and possibly the colleague's output.
Next to this reward scheme, the principal can choose when she and the second agent observe the output of the first agent: either before the second agent provides effort (ex ante information) which corresponds e.g. to a situation where the second agent works together in an office with the first agent and thus has a good idea about the latter's work 1 In the following we provide some examples for information management systems taken from Birkinshaw (2001) and Earl (2001) .
progress before he provides effort. Or after this choice/not at all 2 (ex post information), which corresponds e.g. to greater local and social separation within a firm.
In decision problems ex ante information does (weakly) better than ex post information. This is no longer the case for incentive problems as we show: the principal sometimes strictly prefers ex post over ex ante information. Key for the understanding is that the expected reward that is necessary to make the second agent work hard is higher under ex ante than under ex post information if the first agent's output is informative about the second agent's effort (negative incentive effect on the second agent). The argument is roughly as follows. An informative output helps to "estimate" the agent's effort (see Section 2 for the precise definition of informativeness). Thus, when the second agent observes it before his effort choice, he learns about the relative impact of his effort on his success probability: for example, after seeing a low output of the first agent he knows that his effort does not change his success probability much. This implies that a high output-contingent reward is needed to make him work hard. Observing a high output provides just the opposite information and a low reward is needed. But this low reward also suffices to motivate the second agent under ex post information: the principal pays him only a positive wage if he and the first agent succeed. Thus, overall the expected reward is higher under ex ante information. In contrast, if the first agent's output is uninformative about the second agent's effort, observing it does not change incentives and the expected rewards under ex ante and ex post information are equal.
But the colleague's outputs being informative about effort can also lead to a positive effect under ex ante information. If, say, the second agent's output is informative about the first agent's effort, the principal rewards the first agent dependent on his own and the second agent's performance. Thus, the latter's effort influences the costs to implement a given effort for the first agent, or vice versa (motivation effect). For example, implementation costs for the first agent can be lower if the second agent shirks. As we will show, having the possibility to implement state contingent effort levels under the ex ante information scenario allows to exploit this effect more often. This influence is not present if the agents' outputs are uninformative about each other's effort, because the principal rewards the agents then independently from each other.
Taking the costs to implement a given effort and revenues together, we show that ex ante information cannot harm (and sometimes benefit) if the agents' outputs are uninformative about each other's effort: it has neither an impact on the first, nor on the second agent's incentives. Thus, the two agent incentive problem behaves like a simple decision problem: if there a common productivity shocks one can exploit ex ante information to strictly increase profits by tailoring efforts (gains from tailoring effort), otherwise one ignores it. We show that such common productivity shocks can be present even though 2 In case the information is verifiable it does not matter whether the agent receives the information ex post or not at all.
the agents' outputs are uninformative about each others' effort. In contrast, if this output is informative, ex ante information affects the incentives of the second agent. This creates a trade-off between exploiting the flexibility gains ex ante information provides (gains from tailoring effort, the motivation effect) and avoiding the negative incentive effect on the second agent. We show that ex ante information can do strictly worse than ex post information. It still can do strictly better, now not only because of gains from tailoring of effort, but also because of the motivation effect. But compared to an uninformative output, the principal often foregoes these flexibility gains by not providing agents early information to avoid the negative incentive effect on the second agent.
We discuss two possible applications of these results to an organizational context -relating the reward scheme and organizational structure of a firm to the way it manages information. First, outputs being uninformative (informative) implies that the principal rewards the agents independently from (relative to) each other. Thus, we expect that firms gain employees access to information about colleagues if this information is irrelevant for their compensation.
Second, the colleague's output is also more likely to be uninformative (informative) about the agent's effort if the two work on different (similar) tasks: according to Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000) the correlation of outputs between different departments (i.e. agents who work on different tasks) is weaker than the one between different products (i.e. agents who work on similar tasks for different products). Thus, we expect that the access to information about colleagues depends also on the similarity of tasks in a firm. Consider here as an example the so called multi-divisional form (M-form) and unitary form (Uform). The former groups employees not in departments, but according to products or regions -providing better opportunities to foster communication and interactions between agents working on different tasks (Bresman, Birkinshaw, and Nobel 1999, Qian, Roland, and Xu 2006) . From our results it follows that it cannot harm if the marketing expert observes the performance of his research and development colleague under the M-form: the latter's performance should be very uninformative about the former's effort (or vice versa). But it can benefit if there are common productivity shocks. Thus, we expect such firms to be more transparent: they are more likely to use open-plan offices, foster social interactions or a system of shared information on performance evaluations and wages. In contrast, the U-form firm is organized along functional lines. For example, all marketing experts -which are responsible for different products -work together in one division and thus can more easily communicate and observe the work progress of their marketing colleagues before making decisions. As the performance of one marketing expert is likely to be informative about the effort of another, the observation of colleagues can harm and such firms are likely to be less transparent.
The paper is structured as follows. After discussing the related literature in the next paragraph, we introduce the model in Section 2. Section 3 derives and compares the optimal wage scheme for the ex post and ex ante information scenarios. In Section 4
we show under which circumstances the one or the other scenario yields higher overall profits. We discuss possible applications of these results and conclude in Section 5. All proofs are in the appendix.
Related Literature The paper is related to the theoretical literature that asks about the optimal timing of information and feedback. There are three strands in this field:
exogenous wage scheme models with multiple agents, endogenous wage scheme models with a single agent and such with multiple agents. Our paper falls in the third category. The exogenous wage scheme models consider dynamic tournaments with fixed prizes, i.e. the wage scheme and wages are taken as given (Lizzeri, Meyer, and Persico 1999 , Ederer 2004 , Jost and Kräkel 2006 , Aoyagi 2007 . They show that the optimality of a feedback policy is determined by the concavity of the principal's profit function in effort. In comparison, in an endogenous wage model the concavity can never harm and a new effect arises: feedback affects the wage scheme. Ederer (2004) considers in his tournament model an effect we also take into account: gains from tailoring effort in the profit function.
The second strand of the literature considers the optimal timing of information in endogenous wage scheme models with a single agent (Lizzeri, Meyer, and Persico 2002, Nafziger 2007 ). Lizzeri, Meyer, and Persico (2002) show in a two period model that providing an agent with information about his previous performance harms: to provide second period incentives the principal has to reward the agent also after a first period failuredecreasing first period incentives. In contrast, in our model another agent is employed in the second period. Thus, there is no negative first period incentive effect (but possibly a positive one) and second period incentives are negatively affected. 3 Nafziger (2007) asks in a single agent model whether an agent should observe a signal before or after his effort choice. The signal is drawn from some exogenously given probability function. In contrast, here this distribution depends on the effort of the first agent. While the results
show that this distinction is irrelevant for the agent who receives the information before his effort choice (his incentives are adversely affected), the motivation effect can arise only in the multiple agent model.
Under the third stream we subsume models that ask about the optimal timing of information in endogenous wage scheme models with many agents. Here the existing literature focuses on team models. In such the principal only observes the joint output of the agents -not as in our paper the individual outputs (Winter 2006 , Goldfayn 2007 , Ludwig 2007 ).
3 A single agent model that considers very different effects and which is hence hard to compare to our model is Ertac (2005) . She asks whether feedback about one's own and a peer's performance should be revealed or not. In contrast to our model, this information is not about a variable on which the incentive scheme conditions.
As a consequence, in these papers the information between the principal and the second agent is asymmetric and the optimality of ex ante information depends on whether the agents' outputs or efforts are compliments or substitutes in the production function. Informativeness about efforts plays no role. Arya, Glover, and Sivaramakrishnan (1997), or Chwolka (2005) introduce in these team models double moral hazard: the second moving agent is the principal herself, who produces jointly an output with the agent.
Hence, there is no incentive problem for her at the second period like in our model, but a commitment problem.
The Model
Players and Production There are two agents, i ∈ {1, 2} and one principal. All players are risk neutral and in addition the agents have no wealth. The value of their reservation utility is zero. Each agent separately produces an observable and verifiable output (which equals the principal's revenue), which can be either high (
or low (x i = 0). The probability that the combination x 1 x 2 realizes depends on the agents' efforts e i ∈ {e i ,ē i }:
. We let agents be symmetric, i.e. f (x 1 x 2 |e 1 , e 2 ) = f (x 2 x 1 |e 2 , e 1 ). The marginal probabilities
do not depend on the effort of the other agent. Table 1 gives examples for joint distributions that satisfy all these properties. We assume that a higher effort leads to a higher success probability, i.e. f (x 1 x 2 |ē 1 , e 2 ) > f (x 1 x 2 |e 1 , e 2 ). An agent's costs of effort are c if he provides high effort and zero otherwise.
Timing At date 0 the principal decides whether to implement the ex ante or ex post information scenario, which we describe below. At date 1, she offers a wage scheme.
The wage of agent i can condition on his and the other agent's output realization, i.e. it specifies four wages:
. If both agents accept to work for the principal, production takes place, otherwise the relationship terminates and the payoff of every player is zero.
Under the ex post information scenario both agents provide unobservable effort at date 2 and then outputs realize. Under the ex ante information scenario 4 only the first agent provides effort at date 2. This effort is neither observable to the principal, nor to the second agent. After the first agent's output realized -which is observable to the second agent and the principal -agent 2 provides unobservable effort. We denote by e 2 (x) the state contingent effort level of the second agent after he observes x 1 and by e 2 (x) the one Table 1 : Example for joint distributions. The parameters a and k can be chosen, such that f (x 1 x 2 |e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ (0, 1).
after observingx 1 , with e 2 (x), e 2 (x) ∈ {e 1 ,ē 2 }. Once all outputs realized, payoffs incur.
The principal receives the revenues net of wage payments, while each agent receives his wage minus his effort costs.
Informativeness about Effort As we mentioned in the introduction, the impact of ex ante information on incentives depends on whether the colleague's output is informative about the agent's effort or not. For this we compare the likelihood ratios:
These ratios show how likely it is that a state of the world, sayx 1x2 , was generated by agent i's effortē i compared to e i , given the colleague provides effort e −i . For risk neutral and wealth protected agents one can characterize with them whether a statistic is uninformative or informative about the agent's effort in the sufficient mechanism sense of Demougin and Fluet (1998) . To understand this concept we briefly (see Section 3 for further details) have to introduce the implementation cost function for ex post information, C(e i |x 1 x 2 ): this is the expected wage necessary implement an effort e i under the participation, incentive and limited liability constraints. The set x 1 x 2 is the subset of states {x 1x2 ,x 1 x 2 , x 1x2 , x 1 x 2 , x i ,x i } where the principal pays a strictly positive wage. A statistic (like the agent's output) is said to be a sufficient mechanism if the costs to implement a certain effort for the agent depend only on this statistic, not on another statistic (like the colleague's output). Thus, in this sense the other statistic is uninformative about the agent's effort. In Section 3 we will show that if
(which also implies that they are equal to l(x i )), then implementation costs for agent i depend only on his output, not on the one of the colleague. Thus, we say that the colleague's output is uninformative about the agent's effort (in the mechanism sufficient sense -which we will drop in the following).
For l(x 1x2 |e −i ) = l(x 1 x 2 |e −i ) ∀e −i the colleague's output is informative about the agent's effort. Here we take as the leading case where the likelihood ratio in statex 1x2
is smaller than the one inx 1 x 2 /x 1x2 .
The intuition is simple: if the colleague's output is uninformative about the agent's effort it does not help to "estimate" the agent's effort in the compensation relevant output states: the likelihood that he provided high compared to low effort does not vary with the colleague's output. Thus, conditioning the agent's wage on the colleague's output cannot reduce implementation costs. If the likelihood ratios are unequal, the colleague's output helps to "estimate" effort and implementation costs depend on this additional signal.
For risk averse agents the definition differs slightly. As Holmstrom (1982) showed, the implementation costs for the agent do not depend on the colleague's output (hence the latter is uninformative) if the agent's output is a sufficient statistic for his effort.
Compared to the sufficient mechanism concept, the sufficient statistic concept implies that likelihood ratios are equal also for the states of the world where the agent fails.
5
The difference is driven by the fact that for risk neutral agents wages after a failure are set to zero and hence these states of the world are irrelevant for "estimating" the agent's effort. In contrast, for risk averse agents those wages are unequal to zero and hence the whole likelihood ratio distribution matters.
As an example consider the distribution function from Table 1 . For k = 0 or a = 1 the outputs of the two agents are dependent and the colleague's output is informative about the agent's effort under the sufficient statistic concept. But for k = 0 and any a the colleague's output is uninformative about the agent's effort in the sufficient mechanism sense as likelihood ratios in statesx 1x2 andx 1 x 2 are equal. For k = 0 these likelihood ratios are unequal and thus the colleague's output is informative also in the sufficient mechanism sense.
The Incentive Scheme
The principal's problem is to maximize for each scenario her expected profits over effort and wages, subject to the agents' incentive, limited liability, and participation constraints. As usual in a moral hazard setting, we can decompose the problem into two steps. In the first step, we fix an effort that the principal wants to implement -(e 1 , e 2 )
for the ex post and (e 1 , e 2 (x), e 2 (x)) for the ex ante information scenario -and maximize with respect to wages. The solution gives us the optimal wage scheme. In the second step, we derive -given the wage scheme -the optimal efforts. We will do this in Section 4, where we also compare the ex ante and ex post information scenario.
In this section we focus on the case where the principal wants to implement high effort.
The implementation of low effort is trivial: the principal simply sets
which results in implementation costs of C(e i ) = 0 and profits g(x i |e i )x i .
The Incentive Scheme under Ex Post Information

Analysis
In this section we consider the first part of the principal's problem under ex post information for the second agent (the arguments for the first agent are analogue), given that she wants him to provideē 2 . Although the case with risk neutral and wealth constraint agents case is similar to the standard one with risk averse agents (Mookherjee 1984) , there are some differences and thus we will fully describe this maximization problem and its solution here.
The principal's aim is minimize the expected wage bill, subject to the following three constraints. First, the limited liability constraint, which says that wages must be positive. Second, the incentive constraint, i.e. it must be optimal for the second agent to provide high compared to low effort given the first agent provides e 1 ∈ {e 1 ,ē 1 }. 6 Third, the agent's expected utility must be higher than his reservation utility (participation constraint):
In the appendix we solve this linear maximization problem. First, the participation constraint is never binding as the agent receives a positive information rent in equilibrium, while his reservation utility is zero. This in turn implies that the wages after a failure are equal to zero: w 2 (x 1 x 2 ) = w 2 (x 1 x 2 ) = 0. Increasing them away from zero would not only increase the wage bill, but also reduce incentives. Second, for the wages after a success, w 2 (x 1x2 ) and w 2 (x 1x2 ), one either receives a corner solution or a continuum of solutions.
If it is uninformative any w 2 (x 1x2 )-w 2 (x 1x2 ) combination that satisfies the incentive constraint is optimal:
6 Effort e 1 ∈ {e 1 ,ē 1 } is the (correct) belief of the second agent about the first agent's effort: the agents' efforts constitute a Nash equilibrium of the second stage subgame. The equilibrium in this subgame may not be unique. So either we have to make assumptions on the probability and cost functions such that it is unique; or we have to assume that the principal can implement the desired equilibrium, which is what we will do here. See Mookherjee (1984) for a discussion and Ma (1988) for other ways how to deal with the multiple equilibria problem.
The intuition is the following: if l(x 1x2 |e 1 ) < l(x 1x2 |e 1 ) it is more likely in statex 1x2
than in x 1x2 that the second agent provided high effort. The principal exploits this by rewarding the second agent with a positive wage ifx 1x2 realizes and punishes him by paying nothing if x 1x2 realizes. If the first agent's output is uninformative, the principal cannot reduce information rents by conditioning the agent's wage on the first agent's output: the second agent's output taken alone is as informative about his effort as the two outputs taken together are. Conditioning the wage nevertheless on such a noisy signal does, however, not harm as the agent is risk neutral for all positive wages. Thus, the principal is indifferent whether or not to condition the second agent's wage on the first agent's output and we get a continuum of solutions.
From these wages we derive in the appendix the expected wage payment
-that is necessary to implement an effort ofē i for agent i given effort e −i of agent −i (implementation costs):
Is -as for risk averse agents -"more information" better? From Equation (1) it follows that the smaller the likelihood ratio -i.e. the more likely it is that the agent worked hard rather than shirked -the cheaper it is to implement high effort. Comparing the implementation costs for the case where the output of the colleague is informative to the ones where it is uninformative, we see immediately that the implementation costs for the informative one are strictly lower for a given effort. Thus, indeed, more information is better.
Some Properties of the Implementation Cost Function
In this section we discuss some properties of the implementation costs function as given in Equation (1). Those will be useful when we derive optimal effort levels under ex ante and ex post information in Section 4.
We have seen that if the colleague's output is informative about the agent's effort the principal exploits the additional information by conditioning the agent's wage on it.
Thus, also implementation costs for the second agent depend on the output and the effort of the first agent (and vice versa). What is the impact of the first agent's effort on the second agent's implementation costs? It depends on the relative strength of two effects: an incentive and a compensation effect. On the one hand a higher effort of the first agent increases the second agent's incentives to work hard if and only if their efforts are complements, i.e. f (x 1x2 |ē 1 ,ē 2 )−f (x 1x2 |ē 1 , e 2 ) ≥ f (x 1x2 |e 1 ,ē 2 )−f (x 1x2 |e 1 , e 2 ). Here the second agent expects to receive the reward w 2 (x 1x2 ) more often if he provides high compared to low effort. This makes it cheaper to provide incentives (the incentive effect).
But, on the other hand, a higher effort of the first agent implies that the principal expects to pay the reward more often (the compensation effect):
This increases implementation costs. Which one of these two effects dominates can be expressed in terms of the likelihood ratio as Equation (1) 
The Incentive Scheme under Ex Ante Information 3.2.1 The Incentive Scheme for the Second Agent
As the second agent observes the output realization of the first agent under ex ante information, we have to consider two incentive constraints -one after a high output in the first period and one after a low one:
where f (x 2 |x 1 , e 1 , e 2 ) is the second agent's conditional probability of receiving outcomē x 2 given the first agent's output was x 1 . In the appendix we derive the costs to implement the effort vector (e 2 (x), e 2 (x)) -given l(x 1x2 |e 1 ) < l(x 1x2 |e 1 ):
where C(e 2 |·) = 0 and C(ē 2 |x 1x2 , e 1 ) =
, because l(x 1x2 |e 1 ) < l(x 1x2 |e 1 ).
In the following we compare the implementation costs for ex ante and ex post information given the principal implements high effort. This comparison helps to understand how ex ante information affects incentives. We see from Equation (2) that the implementation costs under ex ante information are a convex combination of the costs to implement a given effort in statex 1 and x 1 . For e 2 (x) =ē 2 these costs are equal to the ones under 7 As aforementioned, it is optimal to set an agent's wage equal to zero in case his output is low -a fact already used in the stated constraints. As the agent has a reservation utility of zero, the participation constraint still does not bind: he receives a positive rent in each state. ex post information: under both scenarios the principal pays the second agent a positive wage if he and the first agent succeed. If the first agent fails, however, the principal punishes the second agent by paying a wage of zero under ex post information as in this state it is less likely that the second agent worked hard. Such a punishment is not possible under ex ante information, because the second agent knows before he provides effort that the first agent failed. Hence, the principal has to pay him a strictly positive wage to make him work hard. But as it is less likely in this state that the second agent worked hard, a higher reward is needed than after observingx 1 . Thus, overall implementation costs for the same expected effort are higher under ex ante than under ex post information. This changes if the colleague's output is uninformative about the agent's effort. Here implementation costs are given by:
Again these costs are a convex combination of the costs to implement a certain effort in statex 1 and x 1 . However, as these states are equally informative about the agent's effort, implementation cost functions are equal in both of these states. Intuitively, from observing such an uninformative signal, neither the principal, nor the agent learn anything about the impact of the agent's effort on the success probability. Hence, incentives are unaltered by this observation, and implementation costs for high effort are the same under ex ante and ex post information.
We summarize in the following proposition:
8 Proposition 1 (Negative Incentive Effect) Suppose the principal wants to implement e 2 =ē 2 under the ex post and (e 2 (x), e 2 (x)) = (ē 1 ,ē 2 ) under ex ante information.
Then implementation costs under ex ante information:
(a) are strictly higher than under ex post information if l(x 1x2 |e 1 ) = l(x 1x2 |e 1 ), (b) are equal to the ones under ex post information if l(x 1x2 |e 1 ) = l(x 1x2 |e 1 ).
The result that incentives are harder to provide under ex ante information is in line with a case study of Kalling (2003) . He examines the motivation effects of a knowledge transfer programme coupled with a relative reward scheme in a multinational company.
Within this programme firms receive information about outputs of machines in other firms (like machine speed, productivity and waste). He reports that this information has a negative effect on the motivation of employees in weaker firms as they perceive it "as a 8 Technically, the proposition also follows from the fact that there are two incentive constraints under ex ante information and one under ex post information and more constraints are worse. For l(x 1x2 |e 1 ) = l(x 1x2 |e 1 ) the Lagrange multipliers on these two constraints do not coincide. For l(x 1x2 |e 1 ) = l(x 1x2 |e 1 ) they do.
competition they could never win". In contrast, the observation of others has a positive effect on the motivation of employees in stronger firms.
The proposition illustrates how ex ante information affects incentives to work hard.
Of course, implementing low effort, say, after a low first period effort under ex ante information and high effort everywhere else, would lead to lower implementation costs under ex ante information, because the implemented expected effort is lower. But then also revenues would be lower. We will discuss these effects when we derive optimal efforts and compare overall profits in Section 4.
The Incentive Scheme for the First Agent
For the first agent the incentive constraint changes under ex ante information. It is given by:
While under ex post information there is a single effort level for the second agent, i.e. e 2 (x) = e 2 (x) = e 2 , those two effort levels can differ under ex ante information. The first agent anticipates correctly that the second agent provides effort e 2 (x) after a high first period output and e 2 (x) after a low one. However, by the same argument as before, the principal sets w 1 (x 1x2 ) = w 1 (x 1 x 2 ) = 0. This implies that the effort decision of the second agent following low output (e 2 (x)) does not enter the incentive constraint.
Thus, implementation costs are as in Equation (1), where the only difference is the relevant effort of the second agent: under ex ante information this effort is now the one after observing a high output, e 2 (x), while under ex post information it is the non state contingent effort level e 2 . Lemmata 2 and 3 are analogue.
Comparing the Structures
So far we considered only the incentive effects of ex ante information, but did not discuss how the principal influences these by choosing efforts optimally. In this section we derive the optimal effort levels and compare the overall profits for ex post and ex ante information. As the impact of ex ante information on incentives differs dependent on whether the colleague's output is un-or informative about the agent's effort, we will discuss these two cases separately in the following.
Uninformative Outputs
Consider first the case where the colleague's output is uninformative about the agent's effort. Here the profit function stemming from the first agent is identical across ex ante and ex post information. For the second agent the profit function under ex post information is:
And under ex ante information it is (where expectations are taken over x 1 ):
The profit component related to the second agent under ex ante information is a convex combination of the one under ex post information as the incentives of the second agent are unaltered by the information, Thus, if one imposes e 2 (x) = e 2 (x), the profit functions for the two scenarios coincide. But the possibility to let e 2 (x) differ from e 2 (x) under ex ante information cannot make the principal worse off: if it increases her profits she allows these two effort levels to differ from each other (gains from tailoring effort), otherwise she sets them equal.
When do such gains from tailoring effort exist? Implementing e.g. e 2 (x) = e 2 and e 2 (x) =ē 2 is optimal if and only if:
The first equation shows that setting e 2 (x) = e 2 is optimal if the savings in implementation costs outweigh the decrease in revenues, while for the second equation it is just the other way round and e 2 (x) =ē 2 is optimal. As the right hand sides of both equations are equal, it follows that gains from tailoring effort can only be present if Table 1 for k = 0.
While the likelihood ratio in each state x 1x2 is given by e 2 /ē 2 , gains from tailoring efforts can arise for a = 1: e.g. a > 1 implies that a high output of the first agent is good news for the second agent (he is more likely to succeed). But while observing a high output is good news for the second agent's success probability, it contains no additional information on whether he exerted high compared to low effort.
Proposition 2 Suppose the colleague's output is uninformative about the agent's effort.
Then ex ante information yields as least as high profits as ex post information. Ex ante information yields strictly higher profits if and only if it is optimal to set e 2 (x) = e 2 (x),
i.e. Condition 4 holds.
The proposition parallels the results for decision problems. Incentives do not change when moving from ex post to ex ante information if the colleague's output is uninformative. This implies that the principal can ignore the information (set e 2 (x) = e 2 (x)) if there are no gains from tailoring of effort, and exploit these to strictly increase profits otherwise.
Informative Outputs
When comparing ex ante and ex post information, we will focus on the case where the principal implements high effort for both agents under ex post information to simplify the exposition and to avoid tedious case distinctions. Moreover, this case already allows to study the effects of ex ante compared to ex post information: potential gains from tailoring effort, the change in incentives for the second agent and the motivation effect of Lemma 2.
Assumption 1 (High Effort)
9 Effort e i =ē i is optimal under ex post information.
The assumption states that the increase in revenues from implementingē i instead of e i ,
, is larger than the total increase in implementation costs this switch brings along. To determine these total costs one has to take two effects into account.
First, agent i's implementation costs increase from 0 to C(ē i |x 1x2 , e −i ). Second, as the principal rewards the agents relative to each other, one has to take into account that implementing low effort for agent i changes agent −i's implementation costs. This change is given by
If this change is positive, the increase in revenues not only has to outweigh the increase in agent i's implementation costs, but also the change in the ones of his colleague. If this change is negative, the increase in revenues must again only outweigh agent i's implementation costs.
Before we can compare ex ante and ex post information, we have to discuss the optimal effort levels that can arise under ex ante information given Assumption 1:
Lemma 4 (Optimal Efforts Ex Ante Information) Suppose Assumption 1 holds and that it is optimal to implement e 1 =ē 1 under ex ante information.
(a) Setting e 2 (x) = e 2 is optimal if:
(b) Setting e 2 (x) = e 2 is optimal if:
In the following we will focus on the case where e 1 =ē 1 is optimal under ex ante information 10 , as the other case would be similar. Setting e 2 (x) = e 2 can be optimal for 9 We state the assumption -to make it better understandable -in terms of the implementation cost function and not -as it is possible and strictly correct -in terms of the probability of success function. 10 See the conditions in the appendix under which this holds. similar reasons as in Proposition 2: gains from tailoring effort. Choosing e 2 (x) = e 2 can also be driven by these gains, but an additional effect arises according to Lemma 2 if l(x 1x2 |ē 2 ) > l(x 1x2 |e 2 ). The principal can motivate the first agent better if the second agent shirks. Assumption 1 does not exclude the latter possibility, because the decrease in revenues when the agent shirks is smaller under ex ante than under ex post information:
the principal has to implement low effort only in statex 1 to exploit the motivation effect. Furthermore, we see that Assumption 1 does not exclude e 2 (x) = e 2 (x) = e 2 and furthermore that e 2 (x) = e 2 (x) can arise even though [f (
. This is not only driven by the motivation effect, but also by implementation costs in state x 1 being strictly higher than inx 1 .
Thus, four effort combinations are possible: (e 1 , e 2 (x), e 2 (x)) ∈ {(ē 1 ,ē 2 ,ē 2 ), (ē 1 , e 2 , e 2 ), (ē 1 , e 2 ,ē 2 ), (ē 1 ,ē 2 , e 2 )}. In the following we divide these into two groups, which each share similar properties: those where the principal implements non state contingent efforts (e 2 (x) = e 2 (x)) and those where she does (e 2 (x) = e 2 (x)).
Proposition 3
Suppose that the colleague's output is informative about the agent's effort and that it is optimal to implement (e 2 (x), e 2 (x)) ∈ {(ē 2 ,ē 2 ), (e 2 , e 2 )} under ex ante information. Then ex ante does strictly worse than the ex post information.
If it is optimal to set e 2 (x) = e 2 (x) =ē 2 neither gains from tailoring effort, nor the motivation effect arise. But while in decision problems or Proposition 2 ex ante information can never do strictly worse in such a situation, in Proposition 3 it can do so. The reason are the implementation costs for the second agent, which are strictly higher under ex ante information. Similar for e 2 (x) = e 2 (x) = e 2 ex ante information does strictly worse because it is optimal to implement high effort under ex post information.
From the previous proposition one expects that ex ante information can still do strictly worse when the principal exploits the additional flexibility it provides -gains from tailoring effort and the motivation effect on the first agent.
Corollary 1 Suppose the signal is informative about the agent's effort. If it is optimal
to implement e 2 (x) = e 2 (x) under ex ante information, then there exist parameters such that ex ante information does strictly worse than ex post information.
We first illustrate how the principal foregoes gains from tailoring effort by providing information ex post because of the negative incentive effect on the second agent. For example, setting e 2 (x) = e 2 is optimal if and only if [f (x 2 |x 1 ,ē 1 ,ē 2 ) − f (x 2 |x 1 ,ē 1 , e 2 )] < C(ē 2 |x 1x2 ,ē 1 ): the increase in implementation costs is larger than the gain in revenues from setting e 2 (x) =ē 2 . The analogue condition in Proposition 2 implied that ex ante does strictly better than ex post information. In Corollary 1 this no longer holds: ex ante information does strictly better than ex post information if and only if [f (
. While under ex post information the principal incurs implementation costs C(ē 2 |x 1x2 ,ē 1 ) for e 2 (x) =ē 2 those are given by C(ē 2 |x 1x2 ,ē 1 ) under the ex ante information. Hence, when comparing the two scenarios the decrease in revenues has to outweigh the former costs.
The positive motivation on the first agent (present for l(x 1x2 |ē 2 ) > l(x 1x2 |e 2 )) can make ex ante information strictly better than ex post information even though there are no gains from tailoring effort. The latter are the only source in decision problems for the superiority. But as above for gains of tailoring effort, the principal often disregards this positive motivation effect, i.e. she prefers even in its presence to provide information ex post: Condition 5 shows that she will implement e 2 (x) = e 2 if the decrease in revenues is smaller than savings in implementation costs for the first and second agent. But for ex ante information to be optimal, one has again to take additionally into account that the principal can implement e 2 (x) =ē 2 cheaper under ex post information. Thus, for ex ante information to be optimal the savings in implementation costs must not only outweigh the decrease in revenues in statex 1 for the second agent, but also the relatively higher costs to implement e 2 (x) =ē 2 .
Conclusion
We showed that ex ante information can harm if the colleague's output is informative about the agent's effort: while it provides additional flexibility gains, it adversely affects the incentives of the agent who receives the information before his effort choice. This leads the principal to often forego the flexibility gains and provide information ex post instead. This changes if the colleague's output is uninformative about the agent's effort.
Here no negative incentive effect arises and the principal can fully exploit the flexibility gains.
What are the implications of these results for organizations? First, the results relate the way a firm rewards its employees to the way it manages information. In case the colleague's output is uninformative, the wage an employee expects to receive is independent of the colleague's performance. Under an informative output relative performance schemes are optimal. Thus, firms in which comparisons between employees play a minor role for rewards should be more transparent than such in which they play a major role.
The same holds for single employees within a firm: the results predict that firms should prevent employees from observing each other if they are e.g. competing for a prize and foster the interaction among those, who are rewarded independently from each other.
The results second have implications for the relation between a firm's organizational structure and its internal transparency. The colleague's output being uninformative about the agent's effort is likely between agents with different specializations, for example between a marketing expert and a production worker, who work in the same department of a firm structured according to the M-form (Maskin, Qian, and Xu 2000) . Thus, according to Proposition 2 we expect that such firms have a more transparent internal structure: enabling observations of colleagues can never harm, but gains from tailoring effort can be exploited if there are common productivity shocks. In contrast, U-form firms group employees together, whose outputs are informative about each others effort. For example, marketing experts working for different products are located in one department.
Hence, we expect such firms to be less transparent than M-form firms, because observing colleagues, whose performance are informative, harms incentives. This holds even though this transparency would help to motivate some workers or to make better decisions.
l(x 1x2 |e 1 ) = l(x 2 ) gives Equation (3).
Proof Lemma 2.
The difference in implementation costs for agent i if agent −i providesē −i versus e −i is given by:
This is larger than zero if and only if l(x 1x2 |ē −i ) > l(x 1x2 |e −i ).
Proof Proposition 1.
Implementation costs for (e 2 (x), e 2 (x)) = (ē 2 ,ē 2 ) under the ex ante information scenario are
given by:
where C(ē 2 |x 1x2 , e 1 ) =
. As the latter ones are the implementation costs for the ex post information scenario, the total costs to implement (e 2 (x), e 2 (x)) = (ē 2 ,ē 2 ) are strictly higher under ex ante information. For an uninformative output we have C(ē 2 |x 1x2 , e 1 ) = C(ē 2 |x 1x2 , e 1 ) = C(ē 2 |x 2 ) and hence implementation costs for ex ante and ex post information coincide.
Proof Proposition 2.
We let the profit function for ex ante information be Π A (e 1 , e 2 (x), e(x)) and for ex post information Π P (e 1 , e 2 ). Whenever indifferent, we assume the principal implements high effort and ex ante information.
We first show that if ex ante information does strictly better then ex post information, then e 2 (x) = e 2 (x). Suppose not, i.e. it does strictly better but e 2 (x) = e 2 (x). Then the profit functions for the ex ante and ex post information scenario coincide. Hence, the optimal efforts under the two scenarios coincide. But then also the maximized profits must be equal. A contradiction.
We next show that if e 2 (x) = e 2 (x), then ex ante information does strictly better than ex post information. We first ask when it is optimal to set e 2 (x) = e 2 (x). The principal wants to set e 2 (x) = e 2 if and only if Π A (e 1 , e 2 , e 2 (x)) < Π A (e 1 ,ē 2 , e 2 (x)), or:
And e 2 (x) = e 2 is optimal if and only if Π A (e 1 , e 2 (x), e 2 ) < Π A (e 1 , e 2 (x),ē 2 ), or:
Hence, gains from tailoring effort can arise if one of these two conditions holds with ≥ and the other with <.
Under ex post information only symmetric equilibria can arise as agents are rewarded independently from each other. Suppose here first that the principal implements e 1 = e 2 = e. This is optimal for g(x i |ē i ) − g(x i |e i ) < C(ē i |x i ). We have to consider two cases:
1. The principal implements e 1 = e 1 under ex ante information. This implies that profits for the first agent are equal under the two scenarios. For the second agent they are, however, (strictly) higher if it is (strictly) better to implement, say (e 2 (x), e 2 (x)) = (ē 2 , e 2 ) (the other case is analogue). To see this note that Π A (e 1 ,ē 2 , e 2 ) ≥ Π P (e 1 , e 2 ) holds if and only if:
which holds given it is optimal to implement e 2 (x) =ē 2 (Condition 8).
2. The principal implements e 1 =ē 1 under ex ante information. Note that implementing different effort levels for the first agent under ex ante and ex post information could never be optimal for e 2 (x) = e 2 (x).
(a) Suppose (e 2 (x), e 2 (x)) = (ē 2 , e 2 ). Then e 1 =ē 1 is optimal for Π A (e 1 ,ē 2 , e 2 ) ≤ Π A (ē 1 ,ē 2 , e 2 ), or (after some rearranging):
Ex ante does better than ex post information as the previous conditions imply that
(b) Suppose (e 2 (x), e 2 (x)) = (e 2 ,ē 2 ). Then e 1 =ē 1 is optimal for Π A (e 1 , e 2 ,ē 2 ) ≤ Π A (ē 1 , e 2 ,ē 2 ), or:
Now suppose that the principal implements e 1 = e 2 =ē under ex post information. This is optimal for g(x i |ē i ) − g(x i |e i ) ≥ C(ē i |x i ). We have to consider two cases: + [f (x 1x2 |ē 1 ,ē 2 ) − f (x 1x2 |ē 1 , e 2 )] <(1−g(x 1 |ē 1 )) C(ē 2 |x 2 )
< C(ē 1 |x 1 ) + (1 − g(x 1 |e 1 )) C(ē 2 |x 2 ).
(b) Given (e 2 (x), e 2 (x)) = (e 2 ,ē 2 ), setting e 1 =ē 1 is optimal under Condition 11. Ex ante does better than ex post information as the previous conditions imply that Π A (e 1 , e 2 ,ē 2 ) > Π P (ē 1 ,ē 2 ):
[f (x 1x2 |e 1 ,ē 2 ) − f (x 1x2 |e 1 , e 2 )] + [f (x 1x2 |ē 1 ,ē 2 ) − f (x 1x2 |ē 1 , e 2 )]
<C(ē 1 |x 1 )+(g(x 1 |e 1 )−g(x 1 |ē 1 )) C(ē 2 |x 2 )
<g(x 1 |ē 1 ) C(ē 2 |x 2 )
< C(ē 1 |x 1 ) + g(x 1 |e 1 ) C(ē 2 |x 2 ).
Proof Assumption 1. Second, Π P (ē i ,ē −i ) ≥ Π P (e i , e −i ):
g(x i |ē i ) − g(x i |e i ) ≥ C(ē i |x 1x2 ,ē −i ), and third Π P (ē i , e −i ) ≥ Π P (e i , e −i ):
g(x i |ē i ) − g(x i |e i ) ≥ C(ē i |x 1x2 , e −i ).
Using i C(ē i |x 1x2 ,ē −i )−C(ē i |x 1x2 , e −i ) > C(ē i |x 1x2 , e −i ) ↔ C(ē i |x 1x2 ,ē −i ) > C(ē i |x 1x2 , e −i ) yields Assumption 1.
Comment on Notation
In the following proofs we drop subscripts (which can be done because of symmetry) and define C(ē i |x 1x2 , e −i ) = C(ē|xx, e), C(ē i |x 1x2 , e −i ) = C(ē|xx, e), g(x i |e i ) = g(x|e) and f (x 1 x 2 |e 1 , e 2 ) = f (xx |e, e ) (i.e. the first (second) x/e is the output of agent one (two)). We let the profit function for ex ante information be Π A (e 1 , e 2 (x), e(x)) and for ex post information Π P (e 1 , e 2 ).
Proof Lemma 4.
We discuss which effort levels can arise as a global optimum. First we show under which conditions e 1 = e 1 can never be optimal. Proof Proposition 3.
Suppose (e 1 , e 2 (x), e 2 (x)) = (ē 1 ,ē 2 ,ē 2 ). Then profits for the first agent and revenues for the second agent are identical for ex ante and ex post information. It follows, however, from Proposition 1 that implementation costs are strictly higher for the second agent under ex ante information. Suppose (e 1 , e 2 (x), e 2 (x)) = (ē 1 , e 2 , e 2 ). Then it follows from Assumption 1 that overall profits are lower under ex ante information.
Proof Corollary 1.
Optimality of Ex Ante Information given (ē 1 , e 2 ,ē 2 ) Ex ante information does strictly better than ex post information if and only if Π P (ē 1 ,ē 2 ) < Π A (ē 1 , e 2 ,ē 2 ), or:
[f (xx|ē,ē) − f (xx|ē, e)] < 2 C(ē|xx,ē) − C(ē|xx, e) − (1 − g(x|ē))C(ē|xx,ē).
Comparing to Condition 13: 2 C(ē|xx,ē) − C(ē|xx, e) − (1 − g(x|ē))C(ē|xx,ē) <
(1 + g(x|ē)) C(ē|xx,ē) − C(ē|xx, e) as C(ē|xx,ē) < C(ē|xx,ē). Hence, a positive motivation effect on the first agent exist, but is not exploited (the principal chooses the ex post information scenario) to avoid the higher implementation costs for the second agent under the ex ante information scenario in state x 1x2 . To see that ex ante information can be optimal even though no gains of tailoring exist (i.e. f (x|x,ē,ē) − f (x|x,ē, e) = g(x|ē) − g(x|e)) note that the above condition is compatible with Assumption 1 given no gains from tailoring if 2 C(ē|xx,ē)−C(ē|xx,e)−(1−g(x|ē))C(ē|xx,ē) g(x|ē)
≤ 2 C(ē|xx,ē) − C(ē|xx, e), which can hold.
Optimality of Ex Ante Information given (ē 1 ,ē 2 , e 2 ) Ex ante information does strictly better than ex post information if and only if Π P (ē 1 ,ē 2 ) < Π A (ē 1 ,ē 2 , e 2 ), or:
[f (xx|ē,ē) − f (xx|ē, e)] < (1 − g(x|ē)) C(ē|xx,ē).
Comparing this to Condition 12 we see -as C(ē|xx,ē) < C(xx|ē,ē) -that gains from tailoring effort exist which are not exploited: the principal chooses the ex post information scenario, where he can "implement" e 2 (x) =ē 2 at the lower costs (1 − g(x|ē)) C(ē|xx,ē).
